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ABSTRACT—The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984, also known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, was enacted with the dual 
goals of fostering economic incentives for pioneer pharmaceutical research 
and development as well as making available more low-cost generic 
alternatives. While generally regarded as haaving successfully balanced 
both branded and generic interests, the Act’s provisions have also been 
circumvented and manipulated by pharmaceutical companies’ 
anticompetitive efforts, as illustrated by two recent decisions regarding its 
Patent Term Extension provision. In Ortho–McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. 
Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, both decided 
in May 2010, the Federal Circuit affirmed term extensions on new 
compounds highly related to drugs already approved and in commercial use 
in order to compensate for time lost during lengthy Food and Drug 
Administration regulatory review. Such decisions signal a shift in the 
historically inconsistent Federal Circuit treatment of the statutory term 
“product” for purposes of patent-term-extension analysis by easing 
extension grants for new drug products highly related to those previously 
approved and marketed. This Comment argues that a reversal from the 
Federal Circuit’s recent treatment of highly related compounds is necessary 
to establish a more beneficial balance between innovation and consumer 
protection in the patent regime, and to prevent further manipulation of 
Hatch–Waxman provisions. 
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The stated purpose of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, is “to 
make available more low cost generic drugs” and “to create a new incentive 
for increased expenditures for research and development,”1 better 
motivating drug companies to supply the American public with “the best 
medicine that pharmaceutical science can provide.”2 In furtherance of these 
goals, the Hatch–Waxman Act seeks to balance the competing interests of 
branded pioneer pharmaceutical companies and their generic counterparts in 
order to protect the financial interests of the consumer while still fostering 
economic incentives to innovate.3 
While the Act has generated greater competition in the pharmaceutical 
market and provided increased access to low-cost generic alternatives, its 
provisions have also been circumvented and manipulated by companies 
whose anticompetitive efforts aim to “turn the [A]ct on its head.”4 Brand-
name pharmaceutical companies employ a number of strategies to extend 
their patent lifetimes that abide by the letter of the Hatch–Waxman Act but 
not by its spirit, including the initiation of patent infringement suits, reverse 
settlement agreements, and the strategic temporal layering of patents over 
 
1  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48. 
2  Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Remarks on 
Signing S. 1538 into Law, 20 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1359, 1360 (Sept. 24, 1984) (statement of 
President Reagan)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
3  See Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-
Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 51, 53 (2003). 
4  Henry A. Waxman, Op-Ed., False Alarms on Clean Air, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at A21; see 
also Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch–Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or Survival of the 
Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (2002). 
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different aspects of one drug product.5 A prime example of a new 
opportunity for major pharmaceutical companies to “game” the system in 
such a manner is the recent treatment of related drug compounds under the 
Act’s Patent Term Extension provision. 
The Patent Term Extension provision provides up to five additional 
years on a patent to compensate for the patent term length and potential 
profits lost to the increasingly lengthy period of mandatory Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulatory testing.6 By restoring that portion of 
patent life for a pharmaceutical product, the statute aims to boost the 
economic incentive for new drug development, a motivation already 
diminished to some degree by the immense research-and-development costs 
inherent to the pharmaceutical industry.7 Despite its straightforward 
underlying purpose, the Patent Term Extension provision has given rise to 
inconsistent and controversial rulings as courts have wrestled with the 
definition of “product” and its application to highly related drug 
compounds.8 Because the extension statute stipulates that the commercial 
marketing of the drug after the regulatory review at issue must be the “first 
permitted commercial marketing or use of the product,”9 the definition of 
“product” is a key determination dictating the validity of an extension. The 
word’s definition is particularly problematic in the context of new 
pharmaceuticals that are highly structurally related to previously approved 
products, such as an approved product’s derivative forms, polymorphs, and 
stereoisomeric combinations.10 A broad interpretation of “product” that 
includes any derivative form of the active pharmaceutical ingredient such as 
salts, esters, or stereoisomeric combinations would foreclose extensions on 
 
5  Melody Wirz, Comment, Are Patents Really Limited to 20 Years?—A Closer Look at 
Pharmaceuticals, 1 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 5, at 4 (2003), http://www.okjolt.org/images/pdf/
2003okjoltrev5.pdf (“Patent protection is meant to reward innovation and research. Skillful lawyering or 
lobbying should not be rewarded as much as true innovation. However, the loopholes further a policy 
that does little to spur new innovation . . . .”). 
6  35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); Behrendt, supra note 4, at 252. 
7  Soehnge, supra note 3, at 75 (estimating the cost of a pioneer drug company in bringing a new 
drug from research stages to FDA approval to be $500–$600 million in 2001); Mandy Wilson, 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic Favored Legislation May Cause Pioneer Drug 
Companies to Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 497 (2001) (citing decreased patent terms, 
risk of liability, and increased research costs as factors decreasing the profitability of drug development). 
8  See, e.g., Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
9  § 156(a)(5)(A). 
10  A chemical derivative is a structural analogue that theoretically can be formed from the precursor 
compound. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 173 (Richard 
Cammack et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (defining “derivative” as “any compound that may, at least 
theoretically, be formed from another compound to which it is structurally related”). A stereoisomer is a 
molecule that has the same molecular formula and sequence of bonded atoms as another molecule, but 
differs only in the three-dimensional orientation of its atoms in space. See INT’L UNION OF PURE & 
APPLIED CHEMISTRY, COMPENDIUM OF CHEMICAL TERMINOLOGY: GOLD BOOK 1450 (2012), available 
at http://goldbook.iupac.org/PDF/goldbook.pdf. 
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any related drug compounds whose parent active ingredient has already 
been marketed. If an ester of the drug for which an extension is sought has 
already been marketed, the argument goes, its forthcoming commercial 
marketing would not be the first marketing of the “product,” and therefore 
no extension could be granted. 
Conversely, defining “product” narrowly to mean only the exact 
chemical structure found in a marketed drug compound would allow a 
subsequent derivative to enjoy its own patent extension since that specific 
“product” would not have been previously brought to market. With little 
statutory guidance, the Federal Circuit has treated the term inconsistently, 
endorsing each definition at different times and thus creating an undesirable 
element of unpredictability in the Act’s application.11 
Specifically, two recent Federal Circuit decisions applying the narrow 
interpretation of “product” suggest a break away from the circuit’s previous 
approach of limiting the prevalence of term extensions.12 In Ortho–McNeil 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and PhotoCure ASA v. 
Kappos, both decided in May 2010, the Federal Circuit shifted to a more 
consistent application of the narrower “product” definition.13 The Federal 
Circuit allowed patent term extensions in both cases by reasoning that an 
enantiomer and methyl ester, respectively, of two previously approved and 
marketed drug products were in fact different “products” than their 
predecessors already in commercial use.14 These decisions contradict 
previous rulings limiting extensions by defining “product” more broadly,15 
and instead make it easier for branded pioneer companies to obtain term 
extensions over drug compounds highly related to already marketed drugs. 
They therefore threaten to tilt the delicate balance in the current patent 
regime between branded and generic companies further away from the 
consumer interest in low-cost, high-quality pharmaceuticals.16 
 
11  Compare Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding 
that the statutory definition of “product” included an active ingredient and its derivatives, such as salts), 
and Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that “product” 
should be restricted to the particular structure rather than its underlying active ingredient), with Glaxo 
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 399–400 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (construing the term “product” to 
mean only the specific structure physically found in the compound, not including any salt, ester, or other 
noncovalent derivative of the active ingredient). 
12  See William L. Warren et al., Unique Active Ingredient in Drug Product Can Mean Patent Term 
Extension, EMERGING ISSUES, May 2010, at 1, 1. 
13  Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1380–81; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1374–76. 
14  Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1381; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1376. 
15  See, e.g., Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101; Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1366–67. 
16  See James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 481 (1986) (“[P]atent 
extension and market exclusivity may be costly to consumers, but real increases in future drug 
innovation may not follow.”). 
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Although a consistent, predictable approach to patent term extensions 
is desirable, the Federal Circuit’s current trend towards relaxing term-
extension grants signals dangerous consequences for a patent system 
currently struggling to balance the competing interests of consumers, 
branded pharmaceutical companies, and generic manufacturers.17 Indeed, 
with anticompetitive incentives already being fostered, albeit inadvertently, 
by other provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act, major pharmaceutical 
companies are hardly in need of another legislative loophole to exploit in 
order to extend patent lifetimes.18 The Federal Circuit should therefore 
abandon its current endorsement of a narrow definition of “product” in 
favor of its prior line of reasoning where it interpreted the term more 
broadly. A broad interpretation of “product” limits the granting of 
extensions and better upholds the harmonizing aims of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act. This interpretation not only reflects the desired purpose of the term-
extension provision, but also fosters the desired balance between the 
incentive to innovate and the concern for consumer protection in the patent 
regime.19 
Part I of this Comment introduces the history of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act and its patent-term-extension provision. Part II discusses the difficulties 
that the ambiguous “product” language within the statute creates for the 
courts, and Part III covers the courts’ past disparate treatment of related 
drug compounds in the context of term extensions and examines the 
rationales behind these inconsistent rulings. Part IV explains the Federal 
Circuit’s recent rulings in Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure ASA and the 
implications for future related drug compound cases. Finally, Part V argues 
that the shift toward a more liberal granting of extensions represents yet 
another opportunity for branded pharmaceutical companies to “game” the 
 
17  Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51 (noting that although the Hatch–Waxman Act was passed to better 
balance the intellectual property interests of pioneer drug developers with the need of the American 
public for lower cost generic alternatives, the legislation has been circumvented by manufacturers in 
ways that “decrease competition in the drug market and, in turn, decrease availability of generic drugs to 
the public”). 
18  See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 248 (noting that the Act has “prompted . . . rival competitors to 
join hands” in anticompetitive agreements); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, in 
4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 145, 147 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004) (“[T]he major 
drug companies have learned to game the system to delay competition, creating a need for a fresh look 
at the special Hatch–Waxman provisions that govern pharmaceutical patent infringement litigation.”); 
Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to Protect 
Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823, 824–25 (2008) (describing the anticompetitive 
strategies employed by AstraZeneca and Schering–Plough in extending the patent terms over Prilosec 
and Claritin, respectively); infra Part IV. 
19  Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 1, 2 (2005) (“The federal patent system . . . embodies a carefully crafted bargain for 
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful and nonobvious advances in technology . . . in 
return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.” (omissions in original) 
(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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patent system, with harmful consequences for consumer interests. This 
Comment argues that a reversal from the recent shift in the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of highly related compounds is necessary to establish a more 
beneficial balance between innovation and consumer protection in the 
patent regime, and to prevent further manipulation of Hatch–Waxman 
provisions. 
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT 
A. The Pharmaceutical Industry Prior to the Hatch–Waxman Reforms 
The Hatch–Waxman Act, the first major piece of federal 
pharmaceutical drug legislation enacted since the passage of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA),20 was designed to better 
promote generic drug alternatives while still facilitating pioneer drug 
research and development.21 The collective discontent felt by both generic 
and branded pioneer pharmaceutical companies under the FDCA’s original 
statutory framework motivated the passage of the Hatch–Waxman 
reforms.22 Pioneer pharmaceutical companies complained that the 
regulatory approval process under the FDCA significantly shortened patent 
terms and dulled financial incentives to innovate.23 Companies that 
manufactured generics, in turn, characterized the Act as unfairly delaying 
drug competition to the detriment of the consumer.24 The Hatch–Waxman 
Act therefore reflects Congress’s efforts to “balance two conflicting policy 
objectives: to induce brand name pharmaceutical firms to make the 
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while 
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of 
those drugs to market.”25 
The FDA played a pivotal role in the regulation of the pharmaceutical 
industry under the FDCA framework and continues to do so.26 Empowered 
with the authority to review the safety of any new pharmaceutical product 
before it could be introduced into commerce, the FDA requires the 
manufacturer of a new drug to submit a new drug application (NDA) 
 
20  Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)). 
21  David J. Bloch, If It’s Regulated Like a Duck . . . Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent 
Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 111, 
112 (1999) (“A central congressional goal in passing [the Act] was to remedy these distortions.”); 
Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch–Waxman Act: History, Structure, and 
Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585 (2003). 
22  Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 590. 
23  See Wheaton, supra note 16, at 434–35 (describing the lobbying efforts on the part of generics 
and branded pharmaceutical companies in the years leading up to the Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984). 
24  Id. 
25  Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.D.C. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
26  Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 587. 
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containing studies demonstrating that the product was safe for human use.27 
Any unpublished data used in support of an NDA was to be kept 
confidential and could not be disclosed or used by another company to 
support its own NDA on a similar or identical drug. Through this 
protection, the FDA acknowledged the high cost of such testing for branded 
companies and the opportunity for generics to benefit at pioneer companies’ 
expense.28 Therefore, even from its inception in 1938, the FDA was keenly 
aware of the tension existing between branded and generic drug companies 
stemming from the huge research costs inherent in bringing a 
pharmaceutical product into commerce.29 
In fact, the Patent Act itself developed from the assumption that a 
period of exclusivity is necessary to stimulate the optimal level of 
innovation for society.30 The Patent Act establishes within the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the “power to grant inventors 
limited monopolies in exchange for the disclosure of their inventions.”31 
After satisfying certain statutory requirements including novelty, utility, 
and nonobviousness,32 patent holders are granted the right to prevent others 
from using, manufacturing, selling, offering to sell, or importing the 
patented product or process.33 For the majority of patents filed on or after 
January 1, 1995, the term of protection is twenty years from the date the 
application is filed.34 A pioneer drug firm would thus first seek to satisfy the 
elements of patentability under the Patent Act during a drug’s development 
process, and then meet the safety requirements of the FDCA in order to 
bring the product to market. 
However, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver–Harris Amendments 
to the FDCA, requiring not only proof of safety on the part of newly 
patented drug products, but also proof of efficacy.35 Prior to these 
amendments, a pharmaceutical company was not required to corroborate 
any purported health benefits of its products before putting them on the 
market, so long as they had been proven safe for human consumption.36 The 
 
27  Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2006)) (detailing the application and approval process for new drugs); see also Pub. L. No. 75-717, 
§ 2(p), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)) (defining “new drug”). 
28  Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 587. 
29  Id. 
30  ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 565 (2d ed. 2004). 
31  Wilson, supra note 7, at 501. 
32  35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006). 
33  Id. § 271. 
34  Id. § 154. 
35  Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-871, 76 Stat. 780 (1962); see Sam Peltzman, An 
Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049, 
1051 (1973); Wheaton, supra note 16, at 439. 
36  Peltzman, supra note 35, at 1051; Wheaton, supra note 16, at 439. 
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1962 Amendments, however, added the requirement of “substantial 
evidence” of the efficacy of a product’s intended purpose; this requirement 
has customarily come to mean that a company must conduct at least two 
“adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations” demonstrating a 
statistically significant benefit for consumers.37 This efficacy requirement 
proved quite costly to pioneer pharmaceutical companies as products stalled 
in lengthy regulatory testing. Such delays became a significant financial 
drain as years of market exclusivity rights, which companies rely upon to 
recoup research-and-development costs, consequently went unexploited.38 
This problem developed because in general, innovators secure patent 
protection over drug products as early as possible in the development 
process so as to prevent competitors from entering the market with the same 
drug. However, a patent term begins to toll as soon as the patent is secured 
over the product, often before the requisite regulatory testing for market 
entry has been completed or even begun. Thus, with the heightened efficacy 
requirements instituted in 1962, an increasing number of years of market 
exclusivity were wasted in testing.39 One study concluded that the average 
13.6 years of patent-protected market exclusivity enjoyed by drug 
manufacturers prior to 1962 shrank to an average of only 9.5 years by 
1979.40 With the addition of the efficacy requirement, therefore, doubly 
burdened pharmaceutical companies saw research-and-development costs 
increase while the effective length of the patent terms they enjoyed in the 
marketplace simultaneously decreased.41 Indeed, the negative ramifications 
of this reduction in patent exclusivity on the overall level of pharmaceutical 
innovation resulted in much congressional lobbying throughout the 1970s.42 
During this decade the Executive Branch also began to advocate restoring a 
longer period of patent exclusivity.43 
Pioneer companies were not the only players in the pharmaceutical 
market burdened by the pre-Hatch–Waxman regulatory framework. The 
effective term-length reduction occasioned by the passage of the 1962 
 
37  Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and Well-
Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (May 8, 1970); Weiswasser, supra note 21, 
at 588 & n.15 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 7250). 
38  See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 588. Marketing exclusivity is a primary benefit of a patent, as 
it allows a patent holder to exclude any other manufacturers from intruding on the market for its product, 
and thus represents the opportunity to be the sole beneficiary of any financial gain from the product. 
Wheaton, supra note 16, at 434–35 (discussing pioneer companies’ reliance on their period of market 
exclusivity to recoup innovation costs). 
39  See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 588. 
40  Gorlin, supra note 18, at 826. 
41  See id. (describing the FDCA amendments as “significantly shorten[ing] the window of 
exclusivity within which manufacturers could recoup their investment”). 
42  See Wheaton, supra note 16, at 435. 
43  See Gorlin, supra note 18, at 826. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations formally 
supported restoring a term of marketing exclusivity to pharmaceutical patents. Id. 
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Amendments was also onerous to generic manufacturers, who were now 
responsible for proving the efficacy—in addition to the safety—of their 
products.44 The generic industry furthermore could not recycle either the 
efficacy or safety studies already conducted by their pioneer counterparts on 
the originally patented drug they were now seeking to replicate.45 As a 
result, the costs of independently proving safety and efficacy in order to 
gain FDA approval for an equivalent drug were often prohibitively large for 
generic manufacturers, dramatically lessening the economic incentive to 
bring a low-cost alternative to market.46 
Further stifling generics was the fact that whatever independent studies 
a generic manufacturer did opt to perform could only take place after the 
pioneer drug went off patent.47 This requirement effectively lengthened the 
patent term life of a given drug since generic entry was delayed until both 
the patent expired and after independent testing could be completed.48 
Consequently, the generic presence in the pharmaceutical marketplace 
dwindled drastically.49 
By 1984, as a result of the general unwillingness of generic drug 
manufacturers to shoulder the cost necessary to achieve FDA approval, only 
35% of off-patent products had generic equivalents.50 With generic 
competition stifled and the economic incentives for pioneer companies to 
develop new medicines dulled by the FDCA’s regulatory scheme, 
congressional fears of rising drug costs and decreasing availability of 
pharmaceuticals intensified.51 
B. The Balancing Provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act 
In order to effectively remedy this potential market stagnation, 
legislation would have to assuage pioneer manufacturers as well as their 
generic competitors in hopes of best serving their common beneficiary: the 
American consumer. 
Cosponsored by Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-CA) and 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
 
44  See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249 (describing the generic industry between 1962 and 1984 as 
“not a robust industry” and “not economically profitable”); supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
45  See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act 
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187–89 (1999). 
46  Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 249–50. The Federal Circuit ruled in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. that 
the manufacture of a patented product by a generic company for purposes of regulatory testing qualified 
as an act of infringement. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This ruling was ultimately overruled by the 
passage of the Hatch–Waxman Act, specifically § 271(e)(1). Behrendt, supra note 4, at 250. 
49  Behrendt, supra note 4, at 249–50 (noting that these forces led to a “low number of generic drugs 
on the market prior to 1984”). 
50  Gorlin, supra note 18, at 827. 
51  See Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 590. 
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Restoration Act of 1984 was drafted with a keen awareness of the 
legislative priorities of all three players.52 To address the imbalance between 
the patent-exclusivity interests of pioneer drug developers and the market-
entry concerns of generics, the Act restored patent protection that was lost 
to the profit-stalling FDA regulatory process while relaxing the regulatory 
pathway faced by generic drug makers. The Act also incentivized generics 
to challenge the validity of current pharmaceutical patents.53 In this way, the 
Act aimed to eliminate the statutory distortions affecting both the beginning 
and end of a patent term: the regulatory-testing delay prematurely 
shortening an awarded patent term before the product even reached the 
market, and the delayed entry of generic competition artificially lengthening 
the effective patent term even after the patent’s original expiration.54 
Due to the legislation’s competing aims, the identity of the true 
beneficiary of the Hatch–Waxman provisions is hotly debated—both 
generic and pioneer companies claim that Congress more satisfactorily 
addressed their counterpart’s interests.55 However, both sides benefit 
distinctly from separate provisions of the Act, and it is generally regarded 
as successful in achieving its goals of facilitating both generic and pioneer 
drug research and development.56 
Branded pharmaceuticals benefit most clearly from the patent-term-
extension provision within § 156 of the Act, which allows for the 
lengthening of a patent term to compensate for time lost to regulatory 
testing. Specifically, in order to remedy the front-end distortion preventing 
pioneer companies from benefiting financially from their product during its 
regulatory scrutiny, the Act provides for the extension of patent terms over 
 
52  See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 250 (“[T]he Act . . . was intended to strike a balance between the 
competitive and commercial forces in the drug industry, namely balancing the interests of consumers, 
the brand-name pharmaceutical industry, and the generic drug industry.”). 
53  Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51. 
54  Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between Branded and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: 
Amendments to Hatch–Waxman Past, Present, and Future, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 301, 301 (2009). 
55  Compare Wilson, supra note 7, at 510–11 (characterizing the generic industry as favored by the 
Hatch–Waxman Act to the exclusion of pioneers), with Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of 
Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232–33, 
237–38 (2001) (describing pioneer companies as truly benefiting from Hatch–Waxman, in no small part 
because of their manipulation of its provisions). 
56  Weiswasser, supra note 21, at 586. Regarding the Act’s success in promoting the generic market, 
the FTC has reported that the Hatch–Waxman Act promoted growth of the generic drug market from 
19% of the total pharmaceutical market in 1984 to more than 47% in 2002. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at i (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. The Act has also successfully promoted research 
and development in the pioneer drug industry; the combined $1.06 billion spent by branded 
pharmaceutical companies on research and development of new drug products in 1975 grew to exceed 
$49.42 billion in 2010. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 2011 
PROFILE 42 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/159/phrma_profile_2011_
final.pdf. 
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pharmaceutical products that have been subject to regulatory testing by up 
to five years.57 
As previously discussed, statutory restrictions permit extension only 
for those products subject to regulatory review by a federal authority before 
their first commercial marketing or use.58 An application for a patent 
extension must be filed within sixty days after the product is approved, and 
the sum of the patent extension and the amount of the patent remaining after 
the product finishes the regulatory review cannot exceed fourteen years.59 
Furthermore, despite pioneer companies’ common practice of “layering” a 
series of patents covering different aspects of a single product over time so 
that the drug stays perpetually on patent, only one patent per drug may be 
extended.60 Any lack of due diligence by a pioneer company that causes 
delay in the extension process will also reduce the ultimate term extension 
granted.61 
Due to the extremely high costs of pharmaceutical research and 
development, such additional grants of market exclusivity are highly 
advantageous to pioneer drug companies. One study estimated that in 2000, 
the cost of bringing a single drug to market was approximately $500 million 
and represented twelve to fourteen years of research and development, 
making any increase in the period of marketing exclusivity desirable in light 
of such an immense investment.62 For example, the extra two years of 
exclusivity awarded to the manufacturers of Claritin under the Act 
amounted to an extra $5 billion of sales for the branded product.63 
 
57  35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006). The Patent Term Extension statute states: 
The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or a method of 
manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this section from the original expiration 
date of the patent . . . if— 
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is submitted under subsection (d)(1) 
for its extension; 
(2) the term of the patent has never been extended under subsection (e)(1) of this section; 
(3) an application for extension is submitted by the owner of record of the patent or its agent and in 
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d); 
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or 
use . . . . 
Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. § 156(c)–(d)(1). 
60  Id. § 156(g)(4); Glasgow, supra note 55, at 234 (describing the layering approach used by pioneer 
companies to avoid coming “off patent”). 
61  Thomas Chen, Note, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch–Waxman Reform, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 459, 464 (2007). 
62  David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22, 26. 
63  See Behrendt, supra note 4, at 253. By taking advantage of other extension provisions in the 
Uraguay Round Agreement Act, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and pediatric trials, Schering–Plough 
ultimately secured over four years of extended patent protection, amounting to $13 billion in revenue. 
Glasgow, supra note 55, at 236. 
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Pioneer interests are also furthered by the amendments made to the 
FDCA in Title I of the Hatch–Waxman Act concerning the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) process for generic copies of patented 
drugs.64 Under Title I, an ANDA filed by a potential generic competitor 
must include information demonstrating that the generic is bioequivalent to 
the pioneer, among other requirements.65 The filer of an ANDA must also 
certify that the generic drug will not infringe any patents held by the maker 
of the pioneer drug, that any patents on the pioneer drug have expired or the 
date on which relevant patents will expire, or that the patent on the pioneer 
drug is invalid.66 A generic manufacturer’s certification that the pioneer 
patent is invalid is known as a “Paragraph IV” challenge. If the generic 
company asserts in the ANDA that the generic drug will not infringe 
existing patents or that existing patents are invalid, the generic filer must 
give notice to the pioneer patentee that the ANDA has been submitted and 
include a detailed explanation of his basis for the claim of invalidity or 
noninfringement.67 
Significantly, if the branded patentee brings an infringement suit 
within forty-five days of such notice, Title I prohibits the FDA from 
approving the generic ANDA for thirty months from the date of the notice, 
unless the trial court decides prior to that time that the patent is invalid or 
not infringed.68 Unless the patent litigation concludes in less than thirty 
months, unlikely in most federal courts, the patent holder extends his 
exclusive market power with the filing of an infringement suit.69 Thus, the 
biggest boon the Hatch–Waxman Act provides to branded-pharmaceutical 
manufacturers is the opportunity to extend patent lifetimes and thus retain 
market exclusivity. 
To balance these pro-pioneer interest provisions, the Hatch–Waxman 
Act also addresses the back-end distortion artificially lengthening patent 
 
64  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 101–
106, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–97 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006)); see also 
Wheaton, supra note 16, at 458–59. 
65  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). According to the FDA’s definition, “[f]or two orally administered 
drug products to be bioequivalent, the active drug ingredient or active moiety in the test product must 
exhibit the same rate and extent of absorption as the reference drug product.” CTR. FOR DRUG 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE 
STUDIES FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm070124.pdf; see also Donald J. Birkett, Generics—Equal or Not?, 26 AUSTRALIAN 
PRESCRIBER 85, 85 (2003) (“Two pharmaceutical products are bioequivalent if they are 
pharmaceutically equivalent and their bioavailabilities (rate and extent of availability) after 
administration in the same molar dose are similar to such a degree that their effects, with respect to both 
efficacy and safety, can be expected to be essentially the same.”). 
66  § 355(j)(A)(2)(vii); see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 459 & n.132. 
67  § 355(j)(2)(B). 
68  Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 460. 
69  Wheaton, supra note 16, at 460–61. 
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terms to the detriment of generics. Title II of the Hatch–Waxman Act70 
makes it clear that the manufacture or use of a patented product “solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information” 
to the FDA is not an act of infringement.71 Generics are thereby empowered 
by the Act to begin testing their replication of a branded product before the 
expiration of its patent, directly overturning the ruling in Roche Products, 
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.72 The regulatory testing allowance within 
this provision is unique to the field of pharmaceutical patents; no other 
patent holder is denied the right to exclusive use of her patented invention 
during the actual term of the patent without her consent, as through a 
licensing scheme.73 Furthermore, the Act reduces the generic’s burden of 
proof in its testing requirements to a standard of bioequivalence with the 
patented target.74 Thus, rather than satisfy separate safety and efficacy tests, 
a generic manufacturer only needs to prove that its drug contains the same 
active ingredient and basic pharmacokinetics of the branded product it 
imitates.75 Beyond this showing, the generic manufacturer may freely rely 
upon the safety and efficacy studies performed by the patent holder, thus 
eliminating duplicative research costs and ultimately bringing generic 
alternatives to market more quickly and cheaply.76 
The simplified ANDA process also encourages generics to challenge 
patented products with the reward of a 180-day exclusivity advantage over 
any other generic manufacturers for successful invalidity claims.77 The drug 
application process outlined in the Act provides that the holder of any 
approved NDA must list pertinent pharmaceutical patents it believes would 
 
70  Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 201–203, 98 Stat. 1598, 1598–1603 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 271). 
71  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006); see Bloch, supra note 21, at 120. 
72  733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, § 271(e)(1); see also Wilson, supra note 7, 
at 509–10 (describing Title II’s reversal of the holding in Roche that a generic company’s use of a 
patented product to perform the FDA required testing to bring a bioequivalent drug to market was 
infringement). 
73  See Wilson, supra note 7, at 509–10; Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147, 160–
61 (1989) (“[S]ection 271(e)(1) offsets the benefits gained by the pioneer manufacturers from the patent 
extension provisions.”). 
74  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). 
75  Chen, supra note 61, at 463. An active ingredient is the chemical compound that produces the 
drug’s intended therapeutic effect, in contrast to inactive ingredients used for color or flavor. See Huba 
Kalász & István Antal, Drug Excipients, 13 CURRENT MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 2535, 2535 (2006). 
“Pharmacokinetics” is defined as “the study of the action of drugs within the body, which can, in many 
respects, be envisioned more accurately as the actions of the body on an administered drug. It includes 
studies of the mechanisms of drug absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion; onset of action; 
duration of effect; biotransformation; and effects and routes of excretion of the metabolites of the drug.” 
MOSBY’S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & HEALTH PROFESSIONS 1439 (8th ed. 2008). 
76  See Chen, supra note 61, at 464. 
77  § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pous, supra note 54, at 304–05. 
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be infringed if a generic version of its drug entered the market before the 
expiration of each patent.78 The FDA maintains a list of all its approved 
pharmaceuticals in a publication titled Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange 
Book.”79 Subsequent ANDAs filed by generics seeking to replicate the drug 
in question must reference these Orange Book patents and make one of four 
“certifications” for each patent.80 
The amended ANDA process benefits generics by giving them a 
unique incentive to challenge patents’ validity: successful Paragraph IV 
litigation proving invalidity or noninfringement rewards the generic 
manufacturer with a 180-day marketing exclusivity period, during which 
time the FDA is prohibited from approving any other generic versions of 
that drug.81 This 180-day period of exclusivity constitutes immense profit 
potential and handsomely rewards the first generic manufacturer who takes 
the risk of a Paragraph IV challenge. The incentive to challenge patents 
further promotes consumer interests by creating a “patent-quality oversight 
mechanism” that accelerates the provision of generic alternatives to 
market.82 
Therefore, the provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act alternate their 
focus between the interests of generics and branded companies. They serve 
the Act’s ultimate harmonizing purpose of maintaining economic incentives 
for both pioneer research and development and affordable generic 
alternatives.83 Branded interests benefit from the new statutory potential to 
extend market exclusivity through both a term extension under § 156 and a 
thirty-month stay under the revamped ANDA process.84 Generics, in 
contrast, benefit from the reversal of the Roche ruling and the 
corresponding easing of regulatory testing standards, as well as the 180-day 
exclusivity grant to the first successful Paragraph IV challenger of a 
patented product.85 These special concessions to the pharmaceutical 
industry have prompted criticism of the Act, which contrasts the generally 
rigid application of the patent regime over other industries’ innovation 
interests. Arguably, however, the unique aspects of the pharmaceutical 
 
78  § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see also note 66 and accompanying text. 
79  CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH 
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (32d ed. 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf; see also Pous, supra note 54, at 
304–05. 
80  See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV); Pous, supra note 54, at 305. 
81  Chen, supra note 61, at 465. 
82  Id. 
83  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48. 
84  See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Wheaton, supra note 16, at 465–66; supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
85  See Chen, supra note 61, at 465; see also Wheaton, supra note 16, at 458. 
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industry—including its immense research-and-development costs as well as 
the social value of its products—make such special provisions necessary.86 
The patent system as a whole and the limited monopolies it grants are 
usually justified by reference to their use in promoting and stimulating 
research and invention. The biopharmaceutical industry, necessitating 
unusually intensive investments of time and capital, therefore seems a 
worthy subject for unique treatment by the system.87 Highlighting the 
pharmaceutical industry as an outlier in terms of research costs, a 2006 
study by the Congressional Budget Office found that pharmaceutical firms 
invest as much as five times more in research and development relative to 
sales than the average U.S. manufacturing firm.88 Indeed, it has been 
estimated that the pharmaceutical industry’s research-and-development 
costs for the year 2003 were over $17 billion, representing an average 
increase of 5% per year in real terms since 1980.89 A widely cited 2003 
study further estimated that the average cost of successfully developing a 
new drug, including the indirect costs incurred by a firm through spending 
on failed drug projects, was $802 million in the year 2000.90 The 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole estimates it spent $49.4 billion on 
research and development in 2010 alone.91 
With the average time period necessary to develop a new drug 
hovering at approximately twelve years,92 the opportunity cost of such an 
investment escalates as firms’ time and resources are rerouted from other 
projects.93 Such dramatic economic statistics bolster the argument that the 
pharmaceutical industry warrants special treatment by the U.S. patent 
system due to its unique cost challenges. Without an adequate economic 
incentive to innovate, such as a substantial period of marketing exclusivity, 
major pharmaceutical players would surely exit the market, resulting in 
 
86  Wilson, supra note 7, at 509–10 (discussing how § 271(e)(1) is unique to the pharmaceutical 
industry because all other patent holders are entitled to exclusive use of their patented product for the 
full length of the patent term, and therefore contributes to the dulling of the incentive to innovate new 
pharmaceuticals). 
87  Alijalian, supra note 19, at 2–3 (quoting Abraham Lincoln as describing the patent system as 
“add[ing] the fuel of interest to the fire of genius” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
88  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 9 
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-
d.pdf. 
89  Id. at 7–8 (quoting National Science Foundation estimates). 
90  Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003). 
91  PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 56. In fact, the Obama Administration recently 
pledged $1 billion towards a national drug development center due to concerns that rising research costs 
will slow the pace of pharmaceutical innovation. See Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center 
Will Help to Develop Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at 1. 
92  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 2, 31. 
93  DiMasi, supra note 90, at 152. 
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fewer new and improved drug products.94 This cost-deterrent argument not 
only justifies specialized treatment for pioneer companies but also for their 
generic imitators, as illustrated by the substantial decline in the number of 
generic products brought to market after the enactment of the 1962 FDCA 
Amendments.95 As previously discussed, the substantial costs of replicating 
the efficacy and safety tests performed on a branded drug compound were 
simply prohibitively large for many generic companies to enter the market 
competitively.96 Therefore, from a pure cost-of-innovation standpoint, a 
convincing argument emerges justifying the exclusive tailoring of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act for the pharmaceutical industry because of its high 
research costs. 
In addition to this economic justification, a more policy-driven 
argument can be made for specialized treatment of the pharmaceutical 
industry given the high social value of the products it develops.97 While the 
U.S. patent system exists by virtue of Congress’s general power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries,”98 the 
high social utility of the pharmaceutical industry’s products justifies its 
disparate treatment among the other useful arts and sciences. 
Indeed, congressional concern over the complex interplay of the profit 
motives of firms, immense research-and-development costs, and consumer 
demand for high quality, lower cost medicines motivated the passage of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act in 1984.99 As articulated by Senator Hatch, “With the 
stakes so high, it is imperative that our intellectual property laws provide 
the proper incentives to facilitate a new era in our understanding of human 
biology, health, and disease.”100 Thus, both economic-incentive 
considerations and a more theoretical championing of the high social utility 
of the pharmaceutical industry’s products justify its disparate treatment 
within the patent regime. However, it remains an important check on the 
pro-innovation provisions of the Hatch–Waxman system that, to the 
 
94  Wilson, supra note 7, at 496 (“Diminishing the effective patent term will reduce the incentive to 
develop pioneer drugs and may result in fewer new and improved medications.”). 
95  Gorlin, supra note 18, at 827. 
96  Id. (noting, as evidence of the prohibitive nature of these costs, that by the early 1980s nearly 150 
post-1962 off-patent drugs were without generic competition). 
97  Wilson, supra note 7, at 516 (recognizing the need for adequate patent protection to spur drug 
innovation by stating that “[s]ociety has patent terms to thank for the availability of beneficial new 
drugs”). 
98  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
99  See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent 
Settlements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3–4 (2001) (statement of Sen. 
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
100  Id. at 4. 
106:1419 (2012) Reining In Patent Term Extensions 
 1435
American consumer, “an unaffordable medication may be the same as no 
medication at all.”101 
II. DEFINING “PRODUCT” IN THE HATCH–WAXMAN ACT 
The inherent tension between pioneer and generic companies’ interests 
therefore underlies much of the Hatch–Waxman legislation, despite its 
creators’ best efforts to balance the ultimate benefits each industry enjoys. 
The inconsistent application of the patent-term-extension statute reflects the 
continuing struggle between generic and pioneer interests as courts wrestle 
with the proper meaning of “product.”102 Although the consistency of the 
recent Federal Circuit trend favoring extensions is desirable, a return to the 
court’s previous line of reasoning defining “product” to rein in extensions 
on related compounds is necessary to protect the balance between generics 
and pioneers.103 
Section 156 states that an extension shall be granted if, among other 
requirements: “the product has been subject to a regulatory review period 
before its commercial marketing or use . . . [and] the permission for the 
commercial marketing or use of the product after such regulatory review 
period is the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product.”104 
It is unsurprising that the “product” definition has posed such a stumbling 
block for the Federal Circuit over the years, given the ambiguity of the 
deceivingly simple term in both a legal and scientific sense. Section 156 
defines “product” vaguely as “[a] drug product,”105 a clarification that is “far 
from enlightening.”106 The statute then defines “drug product” as “the active 
ingredient of . . . a new drug . . . including any salt or ester of the active 
ingredient.”107 While this definition is an improvement on the previous one, 
it too lacks the requisite specificity to give it true utility because “active 
ingredient” is also a term riddled with ambiguity.108 
In a general chemical sense, an “active ingredient” is the component of 
a drug compound that provides the biological activity that causes an effect 
 
101  Id. at 3. 
102  Paul Burgess & John Lucas, Which Generic Drug Would You Want to Use? The Federal 
Circuit’s Interpretation of “Active Ingredient,” “Active Moiety” and “Approved Product,” 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 26 (2005) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Pfizer v. Dr. 
Reddy’s was an “unfortunate failure to settle a legal uncertainty [that] may result in even greater 
litigation in a field already plagued”). 
103  For examples of the Federal Circuit’s previous, extension-limiting treatment of the term 
“product,” see, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and 
Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
104  35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4)–(5)(A) (2006). 
105  Id. § 156(f)(1)(A). 
106  Burgess, supra note 102, at 17. 
107  § 156(f)(2). 
108  See Burgess, supra note 102, at 17. 
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on a structure or function of the body.109 Without the active ingredient, the 
drug compound would not have the desired effect on a patient. This concept 
of active ingredient is also referred to as the “active moiety” of the drug, 
meaning the “molecule or ion responsible for the physiological or 
pharmacological action of the drug substance.”110 An “active moiety” view 
of active ingredient is concerned only with the main molecule causing the 
desired effect within the body, rather than the generic salt or ester 
characteristics appended to it.111 
In contrast, others conceive of “active ingredient” as referring to the 
approved product as it exists in the actual drug compound. This definition 
includes any variation on the main, pharmacological-effect-producing 
molecule itself.112 If this molecule were formulated as one of its salt forms 
in the approved drug compound, under this view the active ingredient 
would be the salt form itself and not just the underlying parent compound at 
the root of that salt formulation.113 In this way, this definition of “active 
ingredient” isolates “product” to mean only the specific structure, derivative 
form and all, found within the drug compound. In contrast, under the 
previous definition linking “active ingredient” with “active moiety,” 
“product” would encompass both a salt and ester formulation of the main, 
pharmacological-effect-producing molecule. Different packaging as various 
derivative forms would not exclude these formulations from the umbrella 
“product” classification. 
Pioneer and generic interests usually divide predictably in their 
preferences for one definition over the other. Pioneers have a strong 
financial interest in lengthening their patent terms through extensions.114 
Therefore, a pioneer company seeking to gain an extension over a drug 
whose ester derivative has already been patented and marketed individually 
would advocate for the narrow interpretation isolating “product” to the 
specific derivative structure at hand. In contrast, a generic firm seeking to 
block a pioneer product from gaining a term extension will seek to 
challenge the extension by arguing that “product” should be interpreted 
broadly to cover the underlying active ingredient under the “active moiety” 
definition. 
The Federal Circuit has adopted both definitions at different times, 
creating much uncertainty and unnecessary litigation regarding the 
 
109  See Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/informationondrugs/
ucm079436.htm (last visited July 26, 2012). 
110  Burgess, supra note 102, at 17. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  See id. 
114  Wilson, supra note 7, at 496 (“A secure patent term provides an incentive for pioneer drug 
manufacturers to spend money on new and better medications because it increases the probability that a 
profit can be made after the large research and development costs are recovered.”). 
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suitability of extension grants over particular compounds.115 In doing so, the 
Federal Circuit has at times deferred to the FDA and USPTO’s readings of 
“product,” and at other times rejected these agencies’ argued expertise 
regarding the term’s definition.116 The court has similarly contradicted itself 
in its interpretations of the statute’s “plain language.” In one case, it held 
that reading “product” to mean only the approved formulation or one of its 
esters or salts conflicted with the plain meaning of § 156, and in a later case 
ruled that the plain meaning of “product” within the statute could not be 
expanded beyond the approved product’s active ingredient, or an ester or 
salt thereof.117 The Federal Circuit’s inconsistent treatment of related 
compounds in the patent-term-extension context therefore reflects the 
court’s struggle concerning its position on the generic and pioneer debate at 
the heart of the Hatch–Waxman Act. 
III. PAST TREATMENT OF RELATED COMPOUNDS IN THE HATCH–WAXMAN 
REGIME 
A primary example of the line of reasoning the Federal Circuit 
endorsed before the recent Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure decisions can be 
seen in Fisons plc v. Quigg.118 The plaintiff in Fisons appealed the 
USPTO’s denial of his patent-term-extension application on a new human-
drug product containing cromolyn sodium as its active ingredient.119 Fisons 
argued that the denial was based on an incorrect interpretation of “product” 
under § 156, leading to the extension denial because of the prior presence of 
a highly related drug on the market.120 The court affirmed the denial, 
reasoning that Fisons’s interpretation of “product” construed the statutory 
term too narrowly to comply with the plain meaning of the statute, and thus 
adopted the active moiety view of “product.”121 
 
115  Compare Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (adopting the “active 
moiety” definition of product), with Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 397–98 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (adopting the “approved product” reading of product within the statute). 
116  Compare Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (declining to adopt defendant Lupin’s interpretation of “product” as it “would change the long-
standing term-extension policy of the FDA and the PTO”), with Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 399 (“Consequently, 
we will give great deference to the Commissioner’s determinations as to which patented chemical 
compounds fall within Congress’ definition of ‘products,’ but little or no deference to the 
Commissioner’s surmise of Congress’ intent in framing its definition.”). 
117  Compare Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101 (“Fisons’ proposed interpretation [reading product as the 
approved drug compound only] conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutory language.”), with 
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395 (stating that the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the term 
“product” meant active ingredient or salts or esters thereof only (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
118  Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101 (rejecting the plaintiff’s reading of the statute limiting “product” to only 
that drug form actually found in the approved product). 
119  Id. at 100. 
120  Id. at 100–01. 
121  Id. at 101. 
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Under such an interpretation, Fisons’s new drug compounds did not 
qualify as the first permitted commercial marketing of their common active 
ingredient cromolyn sodium, thereby foreclosing the availability of the term 
extension.122 Fisons argued that this reading of “product” was erroneous and 
should be substituted for an understanding equating “product” with the 
particular drug formulation that had been approved.123 Fisons cited the last 
sentence of § 156(a), which states: “The product referred to in paragraphs 
(4) and (5) is hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘approved 
product.’”124 The plaintiff argued that “product” within the previous 
paragraphs of § 156 must refer to the entire composition of the drug 
product, not just the active ingredient, because the product is “approved” in 
its entirety and not just as an active ingredient.125 
The court found Fisons’s interpretation too convoluted to 
harmoniously exist with the plain language of the statute, pointing out that 
the supposedly clarifying statement introducing the phrase “approved 
product” was followed by, not preceded by, the relevant first commercial 
marketing requirement.126 Per the court’s opinion, “[i]t would do violence to 
the plain language [of § 156] to make the last sentence into a substantive 
definition to be read back into paragraph (5). . . . Accordingly, we cannot 
agree with Fisons’ position.”127 The extension was accordingly denied, and 
the Federal Circuit formally endorsed the definition of “product” that 
describes the term as the underlying active ingredient of the drug 
compound.128 
However, just one year later the court followed Fisons’s unsuccessful 
argument in Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, affirming a patent 
extension over the antibiotic cefuroxime axetil.129 Cefuroxime axetil is a 
derivative ester form of cefuroxime, an organic acid. Cefuroxime and its 
salts were claimed in a patent owned by Glaxo, but only two salts were 
FDA-approved and ultimately marketed under the names Zinacef and 
Kefurox. The parent acid molecule cefuroxime was never approved by the 
FDA.130 The USPTO Commissioner denied Glaxo’s application for a patent 
term extension over cefuroxime axetil, the ester of cefuroxime, explaining 
that its marketing was not the first permitted commercial marketing or use 
of the “product” because Zinacef and Kefurox, salts of cefuroxime, had 
 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 100–01. 
124  35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006). 
125  Fisons, 872 F.2d at 101. 
126  See id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 102. 
129  894 F.2d 392, 393–94 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
130  Id. at 394. 
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previously been approved.131 Therefore, according to the Commissioner, the 
correct definition of “product” was the underlying active ingredient 
cefuroxime—the active moiety of the drug compound. This interpretation 
of “product” followed the reasoning of the majority in Fisons.132 
Glaxo appealed this decision, arguing that “product” was properly 
defined as the specific formulation of the approved drug product, 
cefuroxime axetil, and not the parent active moiety, cefuroxime. To support 
its position, Glaxo noted that “product” is defined in § 156(f)(2) as “the 
active ingredient of a new drug . . . including any salt or ester of the active 
ingredient.”133 Neither Zinacef nor Kefurox contains cefuroxime axetil or a 
salt or ester of cefuroxime axetil as an active ingredient; these previously 
marketed drugs are salts of cefuroxime itself.134 Accordingly, Glaxo argued 
that its patent represented the “first permitted commercial marketing or use” 
of the “product” cefuroxime axetil, and was deserving of a term 
extension.135 
The Commissioner asserted that Congress intended the definition to 
mean any “new chemical entity” or “new active moiety,” encompassing all 
salt or ester forms of a single therapeutically active ingredient.136 This 
interpretation better facilitates the introduction of generic drugs to the 
marketplace, a primary goal of the Hatch–Waxman Act, and has 
furthermore been adopted by the FDA in its own interpretations of Title I of 
the Act.137 While acknowledging that Zinacef and Kefurox themselves are 
not salts or esters of cefuroxime axetil itself, the Commissioner based his 
argument against extension on the nevertheless highly related nature of the 
compound cefuroxime.138 
The Federal Circuit ultimately disagreed with the Commissioner’s 
characterization of “product” and reversed his decision prohibiting the term 
extension, now endorsing the narrower “product” definition.139 Although the 
court agreed that the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 156 was consistent 
with the general purpose of the Act to increase generic availability while 
still maintaining economic incentives to innovate, the court adhered to the 
 
131  Id. 
132  See Fisons, 872 F.2d at 101. 
133  Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394 (omission in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2) (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
134  See id. 
135  Id. at 394–95. 
136  Id. at 394. 
137  Id. at 395–96. 
138  See id. at 394 (“It is undisputed that cefuroxime axetil is the active ingredient of CEFTIN 
tablets. Moreover, the Commissioner does not appear to contest that ZINACEF and KEFUROX are 
neither salts nor esters of cefuroxime axetil.”). 
139  Id. at 399–400. 
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literal meaning of the statute, reasoning that the means through which the 
goals of the Act were to be achieved was a query for Congress.140 
Finally, the court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that his 
interpretation was due deference if it was “reasonable” and not clearly 
contrary to Congress’s intent.141 Ironically, the “plain meaning” the court 
saw as so unambiguous as to justify this lack of agency deference is the 
opposite of the “plain meaning” it found the statute to possess in Fisons.142 
In Fisons, the Federal Circuit found the plain meaning of § 156(a)(5)’s 
reference to “product” to be the underlying active ingredient rather than the 
specific formulation found in the approved product; here, the court found 
the plain meaning of “product” to be the specific derivative form of the 
underlying active moiety found in the approved product.143 With little 
explanation given as to why it was now using a different interpretation, the 
court dismissed the Commissioner’s remaining arguments as policy 
concerns best left to Congress.144 
This conflict of precedent was further convoluted with the decision in 
Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.145 Pfizer received a patent term 
extension on its patent for the drug amlodipine besylate, while Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories had applied for a patent for amlodipine maleate, a different salt 
form of the underlying active moiety amlodipine.146 Pfizer subsequently 
sued Dr. Reddy’s, claiming that Dr. Reddy’s amlodipine maleate patent 
would infringe Pfizer’s patent on amlodipine besylate.147 Dr. Reddy’s 
countered by asserting that the term extension covered only the approved 
formulation of the active ingredient present in the marketed compound—
amlodipine besylate—and that its patent on amlodipine maleate did not 
infringe.148 
This case presented the Federal Circuit with the same question posed in 
Glaxo and Fisons: what is the meaning of “product” within § 156? 
According to its stance in Glaxo, “product” refers to the approved 
 
140  See id. at 396 (“The Commissioner merely argues . . . that fewer patents should be eligible for 
extensions than the plain meaning of that section suggests, and that his interpretation attains a better 
balance between the competing purposes of the Act. Congress, however, may decide, and here clearly 
did decide, how to best accommodate the conflicting objectives.”). 
141  Id. at 398–99 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
142  Compare Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395, with Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
143  Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395; Fisons, 876 F.2d at 101. 
144  Burgess, supra note 102, at 20 (“Without any explanation as to why the term active ingredient 
should mean ‘approved product’ rather than ‘active moiety’ the [Glaxo] court found that the statutory 
terms had a plain meaning. . . . The court made it clear that ‘striking balances in legislative language is 
Congress’ job’ not the court’s.” (quoting Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 395, 399)). 
145  Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
146  Id. at 1363–64. 
147  See id. 
148  Burgess, supra note 102, at 16. 
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formulation of the active ingredient actually found in the drug compound, 
or an ester or salt thereof. Therefore, the term extension would only cover 
amlodipine besylate or a salt or ester of amlodipine besylate (none of which 
implicate amlodipine maleate) and Dr. Reddy’s patent would not infringe. 
However, according to the reasoning articulated in Fisons, “product” refers 
to the underlying active moiety regardless of its derivative form. Therefore, 
the term extension would cover amlodipine and any salts or esters thereof, 
including amlodipine maleate and making Dr. Reddy’s guilty of 
infringement.149 Thus, Pfizer presented the court with a chance to 
definitively settle the definition of “product” between the two 
interpretations, whose differences held drastically different consequences 
for the application of the provision.150 
The district court ruled that the proper § 156 interpretation aligned 
“product” with the specific formulation of the active ingredient found in the 
approved product, and accordingly dismissed the infringement charge.151 
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and ruled that the 
patent term extension applied to the underlying active moiety and all salt 
and ester forms, thus covering Dr. Reddy’s maleate form.152 In reaching this 
decision, the Federal Circuit was guided by the general purpose of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act: “to benefit makers of generic drugs, research-based 
pharmaceutical companies, and not incidentally the public.”153 Cognizant of 
the benefit the patent-term-extension provision conveys to branded 
companies, the court ultimately reasoned that the “product” in this case was 
amlodipine, regardless of the salt or ester derivative form.154 
In ruling that “product” referred to the underlying active moiety 
amlodipine, the court returned to the definition of “product” as referring to 
the active ingredient of the product, or any salt or ester of that active 
ingredient.155 The court appeared to be swayed by Pfizer’s argument that 
changing the derivative form of the drug compound does not affect the 
therapeutically active agent, which is the same amlodipine, whether 
formulated as the salt amlodipine maleate or fellow salt amlodipine 
besylate.156 To allow Dr. Reddy’s to narrowly define the relevant “product” 
of Pfizer’s extension as amlodipine besylate and to thereby escape an 
 
149  Id. at 16–17. 
150  Id. at 17. 
151  See Patent Term Extension Is Held to Include the Active Ingredient of the Drug Product and All 
of Its Salts and Esters Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 765, 766 (2004). 
152  See Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1366–67. 
153  Id. at 1364 (quoting Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
154  Id. at 1366. 
155  Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘drug product’ means the active ingredient of—
(A) a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act) . . . .”). 
156  See Pfizer, 359 F.3d at 1365. 
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infringement charge on amlodipine maleate would be to ignore the foresight 
of the legislation’s drafters, who clearly anticipated potential manipulation 
of the salt or ester form of an active ingredient in order to dodge this 
caveat.157 
While this case may at first appear to be a successful attempt to settle 
the inconsistent rulings of past term-extension disputes, it fails to 
conclusively define “product” for purposes of future extensions.158 The case 
fails to make any mention of its earlier, opposite take on the definition of 
“product” within Glaxo, an omission which proves problematic since both 
the Glaxo and Pfizer decisions were made by three-judge panels.159 The 
Federal Circuit declined the opportunity to settle the “product” issue 
definitively with an en banc ruling.160 Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s ruling 
in Pfizer left Glaxo still standing as precedent, perpetuating overall 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of “product.”161 
IV. THE RECENT TREND TOWARD EASING EXTENSIONS: ORTHO–MCNEIL 
AND PHOTOCURE 
With these inconsistent rulings as a backdrop, the Federal Circuit 
recently reexamined the definition of “product” in two separate cases, 
ultimately granting extensions in both.162 In PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos and 
Ortho–McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. the 
Federal Circuit held that new active ingredients which were separately 
patentable and subject to regulatory review satisfied the § 156 requisite as 
the first permitted commercial marketing of the drug product despite highly 
related compounds already existing on the market.163 These cases represent 
a shift in the Federal Circuit’s treatment of such compounds and seem to 
facilitate extension grants. They have dangerous implications for the 
already fragile balance between generics and pioneers crafted by the Hatch–
Waxman Act.164 
 
157  Id. As the court stated, “The statute foresaw variation in the salt or ester of an active ingredient, 
and guarded against the very loophole now urged.” Id. at 1366 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i), (v) 
(2006); 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)). 
158  Burgess, supra note 102, at 26. 
159  See id. at 25–26 (“Under the rules of procedure, a three judge panel may not overturn a prior 
three judge panel decision.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1) (stating that en banc rehearings may be 
ordered when “necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decision”). 
160  Burgess, supra note 102, at 26. 
161  Id. 
162  See Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
163  See Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1378; PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1377. 
164  Warren, supra note 12, at 3 (“These holdings . . . may provide opportunities for patentees to 
extend patent term for new drug products . . . even if the drug candidates are related as polymorphs, 
protected forms, and different stereoisomeric combinations of a previously patented and approved 
product.”). 
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In PhotoCure, the chemical entity at issue was methyl aminolevulinate 
hydrochloride (MAL hydrochloride), a methyl ester of the known 
compound aminolevulinic acid hydrochloride (ALA hydrochloride).165 Both 
are used to treat precancerous skin growths, though MAL hydrochloride 
achieved separate patentability due to its improved therapeutic properties 
and was subject to its own regulatory testing requirements, a process which 
erased four-and-a-half years of its patent term.166 The plaintiff applied to the 
USPTO for a patent term extension, which the agency denied, ruling that 
MAL hydrochloride was the “same ‘product’” as ALA hydrochloride by 
virtue of the shared “underlying [ALA] molecule.”167 Because a product 
containing ALA hydrochloride was already commercially available, the 
FDA’s marketing approval of the MAL hydrochloride product was not the 
first commercial use of that “product,” and therefore the plaintiff’s 
application failed to meet the statutory requirements for an extension.168 
This ruling was supported by the FDA, who had advised the USPTO 
that MAL hydrochloride was an ester of the previously FDA-approved 
ALA hydrochloride, and proposed that the requirements of § 156 were not 
met.169 The district court, however, was unmoved by the line of reasoning 
endorsed by these two agencies and granted the extension as it found that 
the “product” within the drug at issue was MAL hydrochloride and not the 
parent ALA hydrochloride.170 As a result, the USPTO and district court 
once again found themselves on opposite sides of the “product” definition 
debate, with the USPTO supporting an “active moiety” definition and the 
district court looking to the actual formulation present in the approved 
product. 
The Federal Circuit sided with the district court, adopting the strict 
“product” interpretation instead of the “active moiety” theory. The court 
was especially persuaded by the fact that MAL hydrochloride qualified as a 
separately patentable drug warranting its own regulatory testing, despite the 
similarity of its chemical structure to the already marketed ALA 
hydrochloride.171 The court also appeared to adopt the reasoning proffered 
 
165  PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1374. 
166  See id. at 1374–75. 
167  In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 6,034,267, 2008 WL 5598280, at 
*3, *6 (Comm’r Pat. May 13, 2008) (“ALA is simply formulated differently in the two different 
drugs . . . .”). 
168  PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1375. 
169  See id. The USPTO had consulted with the FDA in accordance with the Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Food and Drug Administration, 
52 Fed. Reg. 17,830 (May 12, 1987), when making its term extension decision. 
170  PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1375–76. 
171  Id. at 1375. 
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in Glaxo: that “a compound can only qualify as the ‘active ingredient’ of a 
drug if that compound itself is present in the drug.”172 
The court distinguished Glaxo and the present case from Pfizer by 
emphasizing that Pfizer dealt with the scope of a term extension rather than 
an issue of extension eligibility.173 The court read Pfizer as standing for the 
principle that an extension “was not intended to be defeated by simply 
changing the salt,” when the changed salt left the “active moiety” of the 
product unchanged.174 Pfizer did not conflict with the Glaxo ruling because 
Pfizer did not deal with a molecule of separate patentability.175 Therefore, 
the court returned to the line of reasoning it adopted in Glaxo and similarly 
granted the term extension over the drug in question, despite its highly 
related nature to an already marketed drug.176 
In Ortho–McNeil, the Federal Circuit continued in this vein, again 
allowing an extension over a derivative form of a known compound.177 The 
drug product in Ortho–McNeil was levofloxacin, a single enantiomer of a 
known racemic mixture, ofloxacin, a known antibacterial agent.178 
Levofloxacin’s manufacturer, Ortho–McNeil, secured a patent for the 
enantiomer based upon its superior therapeutic ability and applied for an 
extension to compensate for regulatory delay.179 The USPTO, with the 
support of the FDA, granted the extension, relying on the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of “product” as articulated in Glaxo.180 Defendant Lupin 
initiated Paragraph IV litigation, stipulating to the validity, enforceability, 
and infringement of the levofloxacin patent, but contesting whether it was 
entitled to the term extension.181 The district court affirmed the extension, 
relying on the Glaxo precedent and citing the “great deference” due the 
USPTO in regards to “product” determinations.182 
 
172  Id. at 1375–76 (quoting PhotoCure ASA v. Dudas, 622 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(citing Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom. 
PhotoCure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
173  Burgess, supra note 102, at 20. 
174  PhotoCure, 603 F.3d at 1376 (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175  Id. 
176  See id. at 1376–77. 
177  Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Lupin Pharm., Inc., 603 F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
178  Id. A racemate is a mixture consisting of equal amounts of molecules known as enantiomers, 
which share the same chemical composition but are mirror images of each other. Despite their shared 
chemical composition, enantiomers and racemates may produce different physical, chemical, or 
biological properties. See INT’L UNION OF PURE & APPLIED CHEMISTRY, supra note 10, at 1223. 
179  Ortho–McNeil, 603 F.3d at 1378–79. 
180  Id. at 1379 (discussing the FDA’s recommendation to the PTO that “[o]ur records also indicate 
that [levofloxacin] represents the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product, as defined 
under 35 U.S.C. § 156(f)(1), and interpreted by the [appellate and district] courts in [Glaxo]”). 
181  Id. 
182  Id. at 1380 (quoting Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Lupin argued on appeal that since an enantiomer is half of its racemate, 
levofloxacin was present as an “active ingredient” in the previously 
marketed racemate ofloxacin.183 According to Lupin, levofloxacin should be 
considered the same “drug product.”184 Furthermore, since ofloxacin was 
already available on the market, Ortho’s application to market levofloxacin 
did not satisfy “the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the 
product” requisite of § 156.185 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, 
however, that the enantiomer’s presence within the already marketed 
mixture disqualified it from a term extension, emphasizing its separate 
patentability and regulatory testing requirements.186 Echoing PhotoCure, the 
court affirmed the grant of Ortho’s application.187 
Together, PhotoCure and Ortho–McNeil represent a shift from the 
prior inconsistent treatment of highly related compounds by the Federal 
Circuit to a more predictable management of these products in a patent-
extension context. This consistency is certainly not undesirable.188 However, 
facilitating patent extensions by interpreting “product” to refer only to the 
approved formulation of a broader underlying active moiety is contrary to 
the greater harmonizing purposes of the Hatch–Waxman Act.189 These 
rulings, and the trend they espouse, encourage patentees to apply to extend 
patent terms on new drug compounds despite their shared “chemical, 
biological, or pharmacological properties” with previously patented and 
approved drug products, “even if the drug candidates are related as 
polymorphs, protected forms, and different stereoisomeric combinations of 
a previously patented and approved product.”190 
While the patent-term-extension provision was intended to be a boon 
for branded pharmaceutical companies, to be balanced out by the safe 
harbor provision and 180-day exclusivity measure allotted to generics, 
interpreting its terms to expansively facilitate extensions transforms it into a 
windfall for branded companies. The Federal Circuit should abandon its 
current trend interpreting “product” so narrowly as to allow highly related 
compounds to gain individual extensions, and return to its previous line of 
 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. at 1382. 
188  See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 102, at 26 (lamenting the “legal uncertain[ty]” of the product 
debate, which “may result in even greater litigation in a field already plagued with patent litigation”). 
189  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48. 
190  Warren, supra note 12, at 3; see also Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating 
Hatch–Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 247 (1999) (“A 
drafting strategy that is designed to maximize Hatch–Waxman benefits will . . . mak[e] certain that 
different active ingredients are claimed in separate patents in order to preserve the possibility of 
extending the patent life for each ingredient.”). 
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reasoning reining in extensions in better furtherance of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act’s harmonizing goals.191 
V. THE “GAMING” OF THE PATENT SYSTEM BY BRANDED 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
In addition to threatening the balance between pioneer and generic 
companies the Hatch–Waxman Act aims to create, the shift in the treatment 
of related drug compounds in Ortho–McNeil and PhotoCure represents a 
new opportunity for major pharmaceutical companies to “game” the system. 
While overall the Hatch–Waxman Act is considered to successfully foster 
greater competition in the pharmaceutical industry while maintaining a high 
level of innovation, both pioneer and generic drug manufacturers have 
worked to circumvent the provisions they find unsympathetic, ultimately 
decreasing the availability of low-cost generics to the public.192 With 
disingenuous and anticompetitive incentives already being fostered, albeit 
inadvertently, by certain provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act, major 
pharmaceutical companies are hardly in need of another legislative loophole 
to exploit.193 A return to the Federal Circuit’s previous treatment of related 
compounds is necessary to foster a more beneficial balance between the 
incentive to innovate and consumer protection, and thus foreclose another 
opportunity for potential gaming of the patent system. 
As Senator Schumer stated in a 2001 Senate hearing: “[T]he balance 
[of the Hatch–Waxman Act] has been thrown out of whack in recent years. 
The large pharmaceutical companies basically have been playing by their 
own rules. As the stakes and profits have become higher, lawyers for that 
industry have picked the Hatch–Waxman law clean.”194 There are a number 
of popular strategies employed by brand-name pharmaceutical companies 
under the Hatch–Waxman regime to extend their patent lifetimes that abide 
by the letter of the statute but not its spirit.195 Examples include companies 
seeking to extend patents through manipulation of legislative loopholes and 
lobbying,196 through initiating litigation alleging patent infringement, and 
 
191  See, e.g., Fisons plc v. Quigg, 876 F.2d 99, 100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
arguments that “product” should be read to mean only the approved formulation of an active ingredient, 
rather than its underlying active moiety). 
192  Soehnge, supra note 3, at 51. 
193  See id. at 70. 
194  Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 99, at 7 (statement of Sen. Charles E. 
Schumer, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary). 
195  See Wirz, supra note 5, at 4 (“Patent protection is meant to reward innovation and research. 
Skillful lawyering or lobbying should not be rewarded as much as true innovation. However, the 
loopholes further a policy that does little to spur new innovation . . . .”). 
196  Glasgow, supra note 55, at 237 (referring to proposed legislation aggressively supported by 
Claritin manufacturer Schering–Plough through lobbying efforts as the “Claritin Monopoly Relief Act”). 
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through strategic temporal layering of patents over different aspects of one 
drug product.197 
Perhaps the most egregious of these tactics is the reverse-settlement 
phenomenon, a practice that has garnered much attention from the Federal 
Trade Commission in recent years as it has grown in popularity with drug 
companies.198 Reverse-settlement payment agreements are essentially 
anticompetitive settlements in which the generic Paragraph IV winner 
refrains from entering the market and triggering the 180-day exclusivity 
period in exchange for a hefty settlement from the branded company whose 
patented product it seeks to imitate.199 Because a single 180-day period can 
realize significant profits for the pioneer, it is often worth the branded 
company’s while to compensate the generic generously to maintain a few 
more months of exclusivity since “[the generic] will not make as much as 
the pioneer will lose.”200 
Thus, reverse payments are technically effective settlement tools since 
they do achieve peace between the respective generic and branded parties. 
But there are also “potential negative consequences that extend beyond the 
immediate parties involved” and which accrue to the American consumer, 
whose access to lower-cost generic alternatives is delayed.201 The Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003202 seeks to 
reduce the threat of these anticompetitive settlements by requiring “pioneer 
and generic firms to notify the FTC and Department of Justice within 10 
days of any agreements involving the 180-day exclusivity period,”203 and 
additionally requiring that generics must “exploit their exclusivity period 
within certain time limits or risk forfeiture of their reward.”204 
Further manipulations of Hatch–Waxman provisions can be found in 
the practice of strategically layering patents and in the authorized generic 
market. Temporally layering patents over different aspects of a single drug 
is a common tool branded pharmaceutical companies use to extend the 
patent lifetime of a product.205 Such layering ensures that with the expiration 
 
197  See id. at 232–33. 
198  Bulow, supra note 18, at 145–46. 
199  Chen, supra note 61, at 466–67. 
200  Catherine E. Creely, Comment, Prognosis Negative: Why the Language of the Hatch–Waxman 
Act Spells Trouble for Reverse Payment Agreements, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 155, 161–62 (2006) (quoting 
Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part II, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.shtm (last modified 
June 25, 2007)). 
201  Id. 
202  Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
203  Chen, supra note 61, at 467 (citing §§ 1111–1113, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–63). 
204  Id. (citing § 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–60 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(d)(5) 
(2006))). 
205  Glasgow, supra note 55, at 234. 
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of one patent over a drug, another feature’s patent protection triggers and 
prevents the drug from going off-patent.206 
Authorized generics are brand-name drugs sold under generic labels, 
manufactured by the brand but marketed and sold by the generic company 
during their period of 180-day exclusivity. A source of much controversy, 
courts have reluctantly allowed the sale of authorized generics because 
there is no statutory provision prohibiting them since the Hatch–Waxman 
Act only restricts other generic manufacturers during the 180-day 
exclusivity period.207 Because the authorized generics are priced like 
generics, they allow the brand-name company to compete in both markets. 
As a result, brand-name companies that manufacture authorized generics 
are criticized for manipulating the 180-day provision in an attempt to 
discourage generics from pursuing Paragraph IV entry.208 However, the 
ultimate legality of this practice of branded manufacturers remains unclear 
and continues to be challenged by generic companies.209 
The application of the Hatch–Waxman provisions has therefore, at 
times, “turn[ed] the [A]ct on its head,” creating an environment in which 
anticompetitive agreements and strategic maneuvering of intellectual 
property are encouraged and rewarded.210 While patent protection is 
certainly of unparalleled importance in the pharmaceutical industry due to 
the economic incentive it provides to counter research-and-development 
costs,211 the inherent difficulties of the industry do not excuse manipulation 
of the legislation meant to balance its concerns with those of the public. 
Vigilant policing of the Hatch–Waxman provisions by the courts is 
necessary to prevent further “gaming” of the system by pharmaceutical 
companies in search of profit. The patent-term-extension provision of § 156 
is no exception: it should be interpreted according to the Federal Circuit’s 
previous line of reasoning defining “product” in such a way as to rein in 
patent extensions, thus continuing to encourage generic competition in the 
industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hatch–Waxman Act was designed with the interests of the 
branded drug manufacturer, the generic counterpart, and the consumer in 
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mind.212 By providing generics with a simplified route to market and 
economic incentives to successfully challenge weak drug patents, the Act 
ensures consumer access to lower cost alternatives to branded drugs. 
Simultaneously, the Act restores patent life lost to branded companies 
because of regulatory testing to ensure the economic drive behind 
innovation remains strong.213 While the Act has generally been successful in 
maintaining a workable balance between these competing entities, 
prompting tremendous increases in generic market share while still 
promoting a high level of pioneer research and development, that balance 
has been threatened by branded entities’ manipulation.214 Scrutiny of the 
recent developments in patent-term-extension case law is warranted, as it 
could have positive effects on the larger Hatch–Waxman balance. 
The PhotoCure and Ortho–McNeil decisions signal a shift in an 
inconsistent history of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the term drug 
“product” for purposes of patent-term-extension analysis. A continuation of 
this current trend of facilitating extensions signals dangerous consequences 
for an already strained pharmaceutical patent system and should be 
abandoned for the Federal Circuit’s previous line of reasoning defining 
“product” more broadly so as to limit term extensions.215 
The Patent Term Extension statute, 35 U.S.C. § 156, was created with 
the aim of restoring a portion of the patent life and bolstering the economic 
incentive for the development of new drugs, lost during the often lengthy 
period of regulatory review.216 Given the broader harmonizing goals of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act regarding generic and pioneer companies, it seems 
unlikely that Congress intended to provide pioneers with another means to 
block generic market entry by allowing highly related compounds to gain 
respective term extensions as different “products.” 
With the Hatch–Waxman Act’s provisions already being distorted 
from their original harmonizing purpose through such tactics as reverse 
payments, patent layering, and authorized generics, the Federal Circuit 
should tighten term-extension grants to ensure major pharmaceutical 
companies cannot abuse another provision to their benefit.217 A possible, if 
improbable, solution outside of the judicial process may lie in the provision 
of increased funding to the FDA to expedite the regulatory process in the 
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first place.218 However, such a remedy would address only the symptom of 
the underlying tension between generic and pioneer interests motivating 
such “gaming” of the system. Conversely, amending the Hatch–Waxman 
Act itself should also be approached with caution, as the Act has been 
generally successful and any legislative tinkering “risk[s] triggering the law 
of unintended consequences, which could . . . result in less research or 
fewer generic drugs.”219 For these reasons, a return to the Federal Circuit’s 
previous narrow treatment of related compounds limiting extensions is the 
most feasible means to foster a more beneficial balance between the 
incentive to innovate and consumer protection with the least disturbance to 
the current patent regime. 
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